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Abstract 
This study uses the sensemaking approach to explore influences on small businesses’ 
responses to the threat of external shocks. By analysing semi-structured interviews 
with owners of flooded small businesses it seeks to understand how owners process 
flood experiences. It also explores why such experiences do not consistently lead to 
the resilient adaptation of business premises. It concludes that part of the explanation 
for low levels of adaptation is owners’ desire to defend their existing sensemaking 
structures and associated identities against information that challenges them. 
Sensemaking structures are only revised if these structures are not critical to business 
identity or if a flood constitutes an ‘ontological shock’ that renders untenable existing 
assumptions about long-term business continuity. These findings have implications for 
adaptation to the growing risk of flooding and to climate change and external shocks in 
general. The study suggests that future research into external shocks would benefit 
from using the sensemaking approach and that survey studies should include 
measurements of ‘ontological’ impact as well as material and financial damage. In 
addition, those designing information campaigns should take careful account of 
businesses’ resistance to information that appears to threaten their existing 
sensemaking structures and social identities.  
Key words: floods; resilience; sensemaking; external shocks; climate change 
adaptation; business continuity; emotions 
Introduction 
This study aims to understand how the interpretation frameworks of small business 
owners influence what they learn from experiences of external shocks – and how this 
impacts on subsequent behaviour. Research into the resilient responses of small 
business to external shocks and crises is rare (Bullough et al, 2014; Herbane, 2013; 
Sullivan-Taylor and Branicki, 2011), enquiries into this topic having seen a brief 
blossoming in the early 1980s before being overtaken by resilience research that 
focused on internal systems and, post 9/11, the resilience of business models and 
supply chains (Linnenluecke, 2017). In this study, we argue that the subject of how 
small businesses respond to external shocks needs revisiting and that attention should 
be paid to the influence of risk perception. Commentators agree that risk perception is 
important and that dangers are perceived differently, but do not usually interrogate 
the reasons for this (e.g. Bullough et al, 2014). We propose the sensemaking approach 
for investigating this question. In doing so, we look at flooding – a type of shock that 
has received little attention in the small business literature (though see Wedawatta et 
al., 2014, and McGuinness & Johnson, 2014). In particular, we focus on an aspect of 
flood response that is of particular policy relevance in the UK (see Bonfield, 2016; 
Cabinet Office, 2008) and elsewhere (Bubeck et al, 2015): the implementation of 
physical measures that would reduce the damage incurred in any subsequent flood. 
 
Flooding is an important issue in the UK, where 20% of non-domestic property is 
already at risk (Fielding, 2015) and the probability and geographical spread of the flood 
risk is growing. The floods of Summer 2007 affected over 7,000 businesses (Cabinet 
Office, 2008), causing average damage of somewhere between £56,000 and £90,000 
(Chatterton et al., 2010). Subsequently, Winter 2013-14 saw more than 3,100 
businesses sustain an average damage of £82,000 (Chatterton et al., 2016) and in 
Winter 2015-16, a further 5,000 businesses were flooded (Marsh et al., 2016). On 
average, small businesses lose over 50 working days when they are flooded and take 6-
9 weeks to get back in business (Crichton, 2006; Kreibich et al., 2007). In one part of 
England (Calderdale and Kirklees) recent flooding caused damage equivalent to 5.4% of 
Gross Value Added (Sakai et al., 2016). 
 
In contrast with shocks caused by situations of enduring crisis, UK floods are localised 
in time and space. In many streets, estates and localities only a minority of businesses 
are directly affected, and indirect impacts (e.g. loss of electricity and transport 
infrastructure) usually last no more than a matter of hours. This distinguishes UK 
floods from shocks such as earthquakes and conflict, in which long-term changes to 
the business environment can be as consequential as the immediate destruction and 
disruption (e.g. Battisti and Deakins, 2017; Cheung and Kwong, 2017; Dahles and 
Susilowati, 2015; Doern, 2016; Dolfman et al., 2007). In the UK, a flood can cause a 
crisis for a particular business without constituting a disaster for the local area or 
economy as a whole, or ushering in lasting changes to the business environment. This 
has implications for the choice of theoretical approach. For example, the dynamic 
capabilities approach has been applied to disaster scenarios that cause long-term shifts 
in the strategic context (e.g. Battisti and Deakins, 2017), but is less relevant where 
adaptation is needed to the emergence of low-probability events of short duration. 
 
This study makes several contributions to the literature on small businesses and 
external shocks. Firstly, it adds to the evidence for the importance of risk perception as 
an influence on the response to external shocks. Secondly, it provides new insights into 
how risk perceptions distort the learning that results from external shocks and how 
this leads to path dependency and the under-use of more effective ways of responding 
to the risk of future shocks. Thirdly, it proposes the notion of the ontological shock to 
distinguish events that challenge business identities from those whose effects can be 
assimilated into existing interpretation frameworks. Fourthly, it questions the 
contention that increases in resilient behaviour can result from the repetition of minor 
shocks. Finally, the research provides evidence of the importance of emotional denial 
and of the need for further research into emotional aspects of small business owners’ 
responses to external shocks. 
 
The manuscript is structured as follows. In the first section, we discuss the 
international literature on the impacts of flooding on small businesses. In the second, 
we review the literature on sensemaking and risk response. Subsequent sections detail 
the research methods used, present the findings of the data analysis and discuss the 
conclusions and implications of the research.  
Small businesses and flooding 
As awareness has grown of the inadequacy of large-scale engineered flood defences in 
the face of increasing risk of flooding, governments have begun to talk about a 
portfolio approach to flood risk management that includes the actions of individual 
businesses alongside the actions of the state (Harries, 2013; Johnson et al., 2005). Both 
resilience and flood resilience are complex concepts that have been defined in a wide 
range of ways. In this study, we focus on the dimension of resilience sometimes known 
as robustness (Twigger-Ross et al, 2014): the ability of a system to retain desired 
characteristics despite changes to elements of that system. In particular, we look at 
one important contributor to robustness, property level resilience (PLR), and 
when/why PLR is introduced after a flood experience. 
 
PLR aims to protect IT equipment, data, products, stock and raw materials (Climate 
East Midlands, 2012; climateprepared.com, 2015) and includes measures such as 
raising door thresholds, dry-lining walls and raising electrical sockets (Environment 
Agency, 2015). Such measures can reduce the cost of flood damage by around three-
quarters (Joseph et al 2011; JBA Consulting 2012; Royal Haskoning 2012). 
 
PLR can be particularly beneficial for smaller businesses. Although such businesses are 
more resilient (Branicki et al, 2017), more practised at crisis response (Atherton, 2003) 
and particularly adaptable during climate events (Sullivan-Taylor and Branicki, 2011), 
they are also more vulnerable than larger firms to crises such as extreme weather 
events (Clemo, 2008; Irvine and Anderson, 2004). Highly localised sale and supply 
networks increase the vulnerability of the customer base (Webb et al., 2002) and many 
small businesses operate from single locations and are therefore unable to relocate 
functions to unaffected areas (Kroll et al., 1990). Also of importance are limited access 
to finance and constraints associated with human resources (Vossen, 1998; 
Bhattacharya-Mis et al., 2015). Underinsurance, too, is an issue (Alesch et al., 2001). 
Less than a third of small businesses has cover for business interruption or loss of 
earnings and less than 50% of the total cost of flooding to small businesses is covered 
by insurance (BMG Research, 2011; Clemo, 2008; Crichton, 2006; Zhang et al., 2009). 
Partly for this reason, small firms are limited in their ability to deal with the financial 
impacts of floods and other shocks (Sullivan-Taylor and Branicki, 2011; Webb et al., 
2000). 
 
Despite these high levels of vulnerability and underinsurance, few small businesses 
install PLR. High-quality national data on this issue is hard to obtain because of 
imperfections in databases of at-risk areas, gaps in the contact details listed in central 
business registers and low survey response rates. However, one national survey 
(n=537) found that only a third of small businesses in areas of high flood risk had 
implemented PLR or similar measures (Thurston et al., 2008) and another (n=40; 
conducted in two areas affected by the 2007 UK flooding – Bhattacharya-Mis et al., 
2015, p52) found that just 10% of owner-occupiers of commercial properties had 
implemented “permanent resilience measures” and 8% had installed “resilient fittings” 
(no compound figure was provided).  
 
These findings are consistent with evidence that smaller firms are generally less likely 
to adapt to flood risk (Evans, 2013; Kreibich et al., 2005) and climate change 
(Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1997; Howe, 2011 – though see Battisti and Deakins, 2017; 
Herbane, 2015). This is sometimes explained by reduced access to financial resources 
(e.g. Vossen, 1998; Alesch et al., 2001), lack of information about the risk and the 
available mitigation options (e.g. Alesch et al., 2001) and a lower capacity to absorb 
new knowledge and technology (Vossen, 1998). We argue that these explanations only 
tell part of the story. Not all PLR measures require substantial capital investment and 
many small businesses have sufficient innovation and bricolage skills to overcome 
capital constraints (McGuinness and Johnson, 2014). Likewise, although information 
can be helpful, it can also exacerbate equivocation (Weick, 1995) and can reduce the 
likelihood that SMEs engage in formal risk planning (Herbane, 2015). In this study, we 
focus, rather, on the cultural factors that influence how information about flooding is 
processed and used. By doing this, we aim to explore the reported inattention of small 
business owners to crisis management (Sullivan-Taylor and Branicki, 2011) and their 
preference for muddling-through (Spillan and Hough, 2003). 
 
Following an established tradition in business research (Huber, 1991) we focus on 
whether and when experiences of external shocks elicit cultural changes that extend a 
business’ ranges of adaptive behaviours. We ask whether business owners’ apparent 
ignorance about flood risk and PLR might be the result not of a lack of information but 
of the deliberate, if unconscious, interpretation of that evidence in a manner that 
facilitates the survival of existing interpretative systems. In doing this, we look at how 
small business owners make sense of flooding and flood risk.  
Sensemaking 
To understand small businesses’ willingness to use PLR, we employ Weick’s (1995) 
notion of sensemaking – a way of understanding the (usually unconscious) process of 
understanding ambiguous or confusing events (see Brown et al., 2015). According to 
the sensemaking perspective, when choosing a course of action, actors minimise 
disruption to pre-existing interpretative frameworks by “distorting information slightly 
to make it fit into existing, and familiar, [causal] maps” (Morrison, 2002, p7). These 
interpretation frameworks contextualise the cues people receive from their 
environments and are the lens through which they view the world around them (Daft 
and Weick, 1984; Smircich and Stubbart, 1985; Weick et al., 2005) and determine how 
to act (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015).  
Sensemaking is “grounded” in organisational identity (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015: 
pS8) and is the vehicle through which social identities shape how people understand 
events (Weick, 2001). Shared interpretation frameworks therefore improve the 
instrumental effectiveness of organisations by providing common purpose and identity 
and enhancing functional effectiveness (Scott, 2005; see also Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
Interpretation frameworks are only revised when new experiences challenge their 
legitimacy sufficiently to facilitate the unlearning that, as Hedberg (1981) first showed, 
is the precursor to new learning (Appelbaum and Goransson, 1997; Cope, 2003; 
Krasner, 1988; Shepherd, 2003). This requires sufficient cognitive disorientation to 
cause sensemaking to become, briefly, a conscious and reflective process (Weick et al, 
2005; Mezirow, 1997). When the evidential challenge is less robust and interpretive 
ambiguity allows room for subjective attributions of responsibility, accountability and 
liability, the sensemaking process ensures the preservation of existing interpretation 
frameworks (see Levitt and March, 1988). Such ambiguity allows business owners to: 
regulate the effects of an event by focussing on aspects of the experience that are 
consistent with existing sensemaking structures; overlook other aspects of the 
experience (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015; Weick, 1988), and find explanations that do 
not bring these structures into question (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). Such path 
dependency (see Cheung and Kwong, 2017) encourages reliance on “the exploitation 
of old certainties” (March, 1991: p71) and leads businesses to eschew more radical, 
creative approaches (Berkhout et al., 2006). This, Berkhout (2012) argues, explains why 
many adaptations to climate risks are based on existing organizational capabilities, 
practices and technologies, and fail to draw on external inspiration and fresh ideas. 
Emotions 
The cognitive disorientation just discussed is an antecedent of emotions that, 
according to the literature on sensemaking amongst owners of small businesses, play 
an important determining role in emotional responses to shock. Here the term 
‘emotions’ refers to the “running commentaries” on people’s concerns (Archer, 2000) 
that allow them to orient themselves to situations (Burkitt, 2014): i.e. the cognitions 
that result from physiological arousals (see Schachter & Singer, 1962), rather than the 
arousals themselves (Burkitt, 2014). 
According to Byrne and Shepherd (2015), cognitive disorientation alone is not a 
sufficient precondition for the review of interpretative frameworks. They argue that 
both negatively and positively valenced emotions are necessary: the former because 
they provide motivation for the review of these frameworks; the latter because they 
enhance the capacity to conduct the necessary cognitive processing. Similar arguments 
are made in the literature on proactivity, where the capacity for anger and fear to 
generate positive behaviour change (Lebel, 2017) is linked to Parker et al’s (2010) 
argument that such change requires emotional energy. Guilt, too, is said to be a key 
element of the essential emotional mix (Yamakawa et al., 2015), because the internal 
locus of control implied by a feeling of guilt is an important motivator of change 
(Yamakawa et al., 2015) and because self-blame results in deeper learning (Walsh and 
Cunningham, 2017). 
The role of emotions has been considered, too, in the literature on flooding and 
natural hazards (Sattler et al, 2000; Siegel et al, 2003; Grothmann and Reusswig 2006). 
These studies, however, have produced inconsistent results. Furthermore, with the 
exception of research by Harries (who links householder inaction in the face of flood 
risk with anxiety and psychological denial – 2008, 2012) no previous studies have 
looked at the mechanisms by which emotions affect the learning and adaptive 
behaviour that result from external shocks. 
This study is amongst the first to consider the role of emotions in the transformation of 
sensemaking structures, and therefore contributes to the literatures on both 
sensemaking and emotions. It also breaks from past practice by eschewing 
assumptions of rational decision-making and applying an approach that focusses on 
why owners make sense of their experiences in certain ways. To investigate these 
topics, the study analyses how owners of flooded businesses talk about flooding and 
flood risk. It looks for evidence of interpretation frameworks influencing the rhetorical 
structure of talk and at evidence regarding the role of emotions in determining these 
rhetorical strategies.  
Methodology 
Research design and setting 
The study used narrative interviewing (Elliot, 2005; Czarniawska, 2004), an approach 
often employed to reveal the mechanisms behind behavioural responses (Elliot, 2005) 
and the meanings of experience (Thomas, 2012). Narrative interviewing is particularly 
suitable for rare and emotionally connoted phenomena (Byrne and Shepherd, 2015) 
and is frequently used in research into business failure (e.g. Byrne and Shepherd, 2015; 
Yamakawa et al., 2015; Corner et al., 2017), a topic that shares with flooding features 
such as threats to ontological security and potential feelings of guilt.  
 
Fieldwork was conducted in England, where three wide-spread and protracted flood 
events in the previous decade had raised the public profile of flooding considerably. As 
revealed by the authors’ experiences in radio and television interviews, the UK media 
discourse usually focusses on the adequacy of state efforts to control flood risk, rather 
than on the responsibilities of individuals or organisations. Hence, despite efforts by 
the government and others to promote PLR (e.g. Defra, 2008; Twigger-Ross et al., 
2015), business awareness remains low and there is no culture of flood risk adaptation 
(Bonfield, 2016). The fieldwork areas constitute contrasting geographical and social 
environments and include industrial estates, high streets and home-based businesses 
in areas that are post-industrial, seaside or semi-rural.  
 
  
Sampling 
A short-list of areas in England in which small businesses were known to have been 
affected by recent floods was identified by consulting the government body with lead 
responsibility for flood risk management, the Environment Agency, as well as a charity 
that works with flood victims. The authors then spoke to the relevant local authority 
emergency response teams and local Environment Agency staff to confirm the 
presence and scale of small business flooding, before selecting areas from southern, 
central and northern England.  
To ensure that participants could recollect clearly how they had responded to their 
experience, while also allowing sufficient time for businesses to have recovered 
sufficiently from the floods, businesses were only invited to participate if they had 
been flooded between one and six years previously. These businesses were identified 
via Environment Agency flood maps, conversations with local people and phone calls 
to businesses in affected areas.  
To ensure the inclusion of a range of perspectives, we used the maximum variation 
purposive sampling technique recommended by Lincoln and Guba (1985) – selecting as 
our primary sampling criterion business size and as our second, the number of floods 
experienced. Recruitment was by the authors, who approached the owners of 
businesses by email, telephone and by calling at premises in person. The study 
included the owners of fourteen businesses. Five had between ten and twenty 
employees and so would be termed ‘small businesses’ according to the European 
Union definition, the remainder had less than ten staff and so would be termed ‘micro 
businesses’ (European Commission, 2003). Six had been flooded more than once, 
seven just once, and one had only experienced indirect flood impacts. Participants 
owned a range of different types of business and were fairly evenly divided in terms of 
tenure (See Table 1). Tenure was not, however, one of our sampling criteria; although 
tenancy limits the PLR options available to businesses, there are many ways of making 
rented premises more flood-resilient (e.g. flood-resilient flooring and furnishings; the 
elevation of stock and white goods).  
  
Table 1 Characteristics of the sample (listed in order of appearance in the text) 
Pseudonym Business Employees Floods 
experienced 
Tenure 
Martin Media 20 Several Owner 
Gilbert Personal grooming  4 Several Owner 
Phillip Restaurant 20 One Tenant 
David Restaurant 10 One Owner 
Karen Clothing retail 1 One Tenant 
Gary IT services 5 Four Tenant 
Gail Printing 4 One Owner 
Gordon Building supplies 15 Several Owner 
Clive Industrial parts supplier 2 Three Tenant 
Barry Property management 
and vehicle repair 
8 Three Owner 
Delia Personal grooming 4 One Tenant 
Simon Manufacturing 1 One Tenant 
John Motor services workshop 12 One Owner 
Ewan Restaurant 6 One Tenant 
 
Data collection 
In an effort to “activate narrative production” in the interviews (Holstein and Gubrium, 
1995: p39) and reduce the post hoc rationalisation associated with reasoned accounts 
(e.g. Hollway and Jefferson, 2000; Czarniawska, 2004) a narrative interviewing 
approach was used for key research topics: the experience of being flooded; what 
happened after the flood, and changes made because of the flood (see Appendix 1). 
For these topics, participants were encouraged to talk at length and in depth about 
their experiences by the use of prompts – e.g. “tell me about the flood” and “tell me 
what happened after the flood”. In these sections of the interview, the interviewer 
interrupted as little as possible, reserving specific prompts until the end of each 
narrative section and keeping direct questions to a minimum. Other parts of the 
approximately hour-long interviews were more conversational and had less of a 
narrative structure – i.e. sections on flood awareness and the characteristics of the 
participant and the business.  
Data analysis 
The analysis process used is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the journey from data 
management to interpretation. After familiarisation with the data [1] (see Willig, 2001) 
an initial thematic framework [2] was created that consisted of themes relating to the 
research question (e.g. ‘property level resilience’; ‘denial’). Next came the process of 
indexing [3] (Seale, 1999), in which all sections of the text were marked that were 
pertinent to the themes in the framework. Subsequently, a framework matrix was 
created [4] that summarised and displayed the indexed data using a data row for each 
participant and intersecting columns of data for the themes (Figure 2). This matrix 
facilitated an iterative interpretation process (Fram, 2013; Glaser and Strauss, 1967) in 
which the analyst was able to “move back and forth between different levels of 
abstraction without losing sight of the raw data” and to engage in “both cross-case and 
within-case analyses” (Spencer et al., 2014a, p283). This process led to the 
development of a set of higher order categories (or codes – Seale, 1999) [5] and 
linkages between these categories [6] (Spencer et al., 2014b), from which the study 
findings were generated [7]. 
Figure 1 The data analysis process (adapted from Spencer et al., 2014b) 
 
Cells in the framework matrix reflected not only the overt content of interviews but 
also analysts’ interpretations of underlying intentions and assumptions (e.g. see 
Austin, 1962; Levinson, 1983; Fairclough, 2003) – for example, the use of blame or 
denial to defend existing sensemaking structures. This reflects the views of Weick 
(1995) and others that people are not necessarily cognisant of the causes of their 
behaviour, and follows the linguistic tradition initiated by Wittgenstein (1953), Austin 
(1962) and Halliday (1973, 1994), which argues that language is essentially rhetorical 
rather than communicative. As per Potter and Wetherell (1987) rather than using one 
fixed method of analysis, the authors sensitized themselves to the different strategies 
that can be used to construct meaning and read transcripts with these in mind, 
uncovering meanings and constructions that might otherwise have been overlooked. 
Analysts critically interrogated their own techniques of sense-making and constantly 
asked: “why am I reading this passage in this way? What features [of the text] produce 
this reading?” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p168). 
Figure 2 Excerpt from the framework matrix – amended to protect anonymity 
(Note: verbatim quotes are in inverted quotes; analysts’ interpretations, in italics) 
 
The methodological awareness necessary for this approach to analysis is indicative of 
the skills required to provide high-quality research in qualitative methodology, where 
rather than being indicated by inappropriate “strict rule following” (Seale, 1999, p34), 
the quality of a project is indicated by the experience, skills and reflective capacity of 
the research team. The quality of this study is further indicated by markers of 
procedural best practice: the use of verbatim interview transcripts that were produced 
by professional transcribers and taken from high quality recordings (Peräkylä, 1997); 
systematic and iterative engagement with the data (Seale, 1999); analysis of the 
interaction between the interviewer and the respondent (Rapley, 2001), and the 
avoidance of data fragmentation (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). Data was coded by 
one of the authors. Although member checks and inter-coder verification are 
sometimes recommended, the authors took the position that the existence of 
“multiple constructed realities” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p295) renders these 
inappropriate. However, to allow readers to assess of the credibility of interpretations, 
long quotes are provided wherever possible (Willig, 2001). 
This approach led to the identification of a number of analytical themes, of which the 
most salient to this discussion were: a. representations of PLR within the interviews, 
and the rhetorical strategies used to achieve/maintain these; b. representations of 
flooding and flood risk, and the rhetorical strategies used to achieve/maintain these; c. 
representations of business identity, and the rhetorical strategies used to 
achieve/maintain these; d. evidence of emotional responses to flooding, and e. 
evidence of emotion regulation strategies. The data in themes a, b and c was used to 
build an understanding of relevant sensemaking structures and strategies for their 
defence; d and e provided the data for our analysis of emotional influences whether 
these structures were reviewed in the light of the flooding. 
Findings 
The findings of the study are presented in four sections. In the first section, we discuss 
the category of business owners whose interpretative frameworks were not conducive 
to PLR and were unaffected by the experience of flooding. In the second, we present 
the category of owner for whom flood experience constituted a sufficiently robust 
shock to prompt revision of interpretative frameworks. Next, we discuss the category 
of owner whose interpretative frameworks were already compatible with PLR and 
were not therefore challenged by the flooding. These three categories are depicted in 
Figure 3. In the final section, we reflect on the role of emotions in the transformation 
of interpretation frameworks for each of these categories of owner.  
Figure 3 Summary of findings in first three sections  
 
1. Businesses for whom sensemaking structures constrained PLR use 
Our discussion of the findings begins with those business owners who had 
interpretation frameworks not conducive with PLR and were able to preserve these 
frameworks because their flood experiences did not constitute sufficiently severe 
challenges. These owners used a range of rhetorical strategies to justify not 
implementing PLR (Figure 3). 
One form of defence that was used by participants was the psychological denial 
evidenced elsewhere in the flooding literature (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006; 
Harries, 2017). Martin (media business; several floods; 20 employees) denied the 
ongoing risk by citing the existence of a new community defence – even though this 
defence had recently failed and his business had flooded as a result. This denial 
enables him to think of his business as “not at risk” and, he indicates, informed his 
decision not to implement a “quite easy” PLR measure by building a flood wall. A 
further example is Karen (clothes store; flooded twice; one employee), who projects 
her denial onto a third party by explaining that she did not suggest PLR to her landlord 
because, “they’ll probably look at it and say, […] ‘is it likely to happen again?’”.  
A further example of denial is provided by Gilbert (personal grooming services; flooded 
several times; four employees). He uses exaggeration and mockery to preserve his 
ability to deny future risk, counter the notion that he should protect his business from 
flood damage and defend the social identity of the business: 
[Flood risk is] just one of those things that we accept. I don’t think it will happen 
for a few years – not in my lifetime anyway. I don’t think so, no. […] There’s 
nothing really you could… you couldn’t bring a brick wall round it because… I 
mean my [business] wouldn’t be my [business] if I had a bloody brick wall round 
it! [Laughter] 
One participant, David (restaurant; flooded once; ten employees), reveals a denial 
strategy that appears close to being overcome by the evidence of recent flooding:  
Interviewer: So if it happened again, then what?  
David: [hesitation] Well, I’ve kept some of the sandbags [self-mocking laughter]. 
So if it happens again, I would put the sandbags in the doors and just… you just 
got to pray that it doesn’t get as bad as that, you know. But then again, who’s to 
say – global warming and all this. Yeah. It could [hesitates] have been worse; it 
could get worse; you never know really. But you can never really tell I suppose. 
We didn’t get flooded as bad as [nearby street], you know.  
Although this passage shows evidence of the rhetorical strategy of denial (“you just got 
to pray that it doesn’t get as bad as that”), the text is heavy with ambivalence. The 
discomfort, hesitation and general cognitive disorientation in this excerpt suggests an 
uncertainty about how to view the safety of the business and a vulnerability in existing 
interpretative frameworks. This is evident in David’s mockery of his own adaptations, 
the sense of futility hinted at by “just” and the admission that it “could get worse”. To 
avoid a final breakdown of the existing sensemaking structures, however, David uses 
the rhetorical tactic of attention deployment (Gross, 2015) to shift the focus of the 
conversation away from his own situation and onto that of others. 
Alongside denial, another way of defending interpretation frameworks is to 
delegitimise behaviour changes that would imply changes to these frameworks. Phillip 
(single flood; restaurant; twenty employees) does this by finding reasons to reject the 
use of PLR and defend his reliance on sandbags:  
We sat down and thought, “there’s nothing we can do”. There isn’t physically 
anything you can have built. But there is and it’s a ledge on the concrete that 
comes up. But I don’t know if it can be built. You know, like if you’ve got a car in 
the garage and you lift a barrier up […] I can’t imagine it’s cheap or practical.  
(Stressed words are shown in italics) 
The text in this passage builds equivalence between what you can do to mitigate the 
risk and what you can have built. By so doing, it constructs a notion of PLR that 
excludes measures that do not involve any building. This allows PLR to be more easily 
rejected. According to Phillip, the only type of built PLR that might be of help is neither 
“cheap” (a synonym here for affordable) nor “practical”, and this justifies Phillip’s 
continued reliance on sandbags and prevents him from having to revise his existing 
interpretation framework.  
In another case, although the interpretative framework of a participant was conducive 
to the notion of PLR, it was not conducive to PLR suggestions from outside experts. 
Gary (IT business services; flooded four times; five employees) had already 
implemented numerous PLR measures – for example by raising expensive equipment 
beyond the reach of floods. As other parts of the interview confirm, he recognised the 
existence of an ongoing risk, admitting that the business would be “knackered” if there 
was a severe event and that they “got away with it” in the recent flooding. However, 
he says “you don’t need advice” and characterises unsolicited advice from outsiders as 
unwelcome interference (like living in “a nanny state”). Self-reliance is a key part of his 
social identity and he interprets the situation, accordingly, as one in which the risks are 
amenable to his skill set and do not require any outside input.  
The analysis presented so far in this section suggests that some of the businesses in 
this study engaged less with the idea of PLR because of sensemaking structures that 
that are integral to their social identities but not consistent with flood risk adaptation. 
Implementing PLR would have prevented them from denying the nature of the risk. It 
would have obliged them to admit that ‘muddling through’ with reactive approaches 
was inadequate, to let go of a notion of flooding as something “normal” and to set 
aside the myth of self-reliance – the fortress enterprise mentality (Curran et al., 1993). 
Rather than set aside these constructs, we suggest, the businesses in this section 
limited their engagement with the idea of PLR. 
  
2. Businesses that revised sensemaking because of flood experience 
In this next section, we illustrate how more ontologically significant flood experiences 
can overcome the defences that sustain existing interpretation frameworks (Figure 3).  
The distinction between ontologically significant floods and other floods was first 
suggested to the analysts by Gordon (building supplies; flooded several times; fifteen 
employees), who distinguished between “big” floods and “ordinary” ones. The 
respondents discussed in this section all described floods that can be categorised as 
big, or ontologically significant. Gail (printing; flooded once; four employees) reported 
that she “only just got out” in time to avoid the frightening scenario of a rescue, and 
described the flood with the terms “terrible” and “devastation”; Clive (industrial-parts 
distribution; flooded three times; two employees) used the phrase “angst and 
heartache”; Gordon described the flood as “like a torrent” and “daren’t go in” to 
inspect his premises afterwards; and Barry (property management/vehicle repair; 
flooded three times; eight employees) described the flood risk as threatening the very 
sustainability of his business. We consider such floods to be examples of what we call 
ontological shocks – events that constitute a significant challenge to owners’ beliefs or 
assumptions and institute changes to business identify as a result. 
These big floods caused long-lasting changes to owners’ sensemaking structures. For 
example, Gail reported that she would not “ever feel normal [again]”, that the flood 
risk was always “in the back of [her] mind” and that she had discarded her reliance on 
society to protect her business (“We are not a third world country; we should be able 
to cope with it, and we can’t.”). This led to the adoption of PLR and other adaptive 
behaviours. Clive relocated his business to a less flood-vulnerable unit; Gordon 
installed a new mezzanine floor for the safe storage of stock; Gail began to store 
vulnerable items above flood levels; and Barry began to market his industrial units at 
more “dirty”, flood-resilient businesses such as vehicle repair companies. 
3. Businesses whose interpretation frameworks were compatible with PLR prior 
to the flooding 
The data suggests that a third category of participants has interpretative frameworks 
that were compatible with PLR prior to experience of flooding (Figure 3). For them 
there was no need to defend interpretative frameworks against the notion of 
adaptation, acceptance of the risk or other learning from the flood. Such respondents 
reported having used PLR or similar adaptive strategies. 
Delia (personal grooming; flooded once; four staff) describes a pre-flood interpretative 
framework that allowed her to accept and adapt to set-backs (“you can’t actually stop 
what’s happening, you have to learn from it”). Her deployment of PLR measures 
“without actually realising” she was doing it implies a tacit knowledge and skills in this 
area. Simon (manufacturer; indirectly impacted by one flood; one employee) had 
normalised flood risk (“everyone in town realises” and “everyone knows the issues”), 
had a “back-up plan” for eventualities such as floods, and had set up his workshop so 
that he could move vulnerable items off the floor and be quickly “up and running 
again”. Karen reported “just get on and deal with it” attitudes and behaviours and had 
applied these to the flood risk, installing a new flood barrier after a flood that she 
described as “not major”.  
A variation on this theme is provided by Ewan (restaurant; one flood; six employees) 
whose interpretation framework was flexible in the face of flood risk because he had 
already been reviewing the nature of the business (“‘do we stay with the old or do we 
spread our wings?’”). His interpretation frameworks were in flux and provided less 
resistance to the idea of flood risk and PLR, so he was able to move all flood vulnerable 
activities out of at-risk parts of the premises.  
The greater openness of such business owners to PLR is illustrated by a passage in 
which another interviewee, John (motor services workshop; flooded once; twelve 
employees), reflects on the possibility of using special valve to stop sewage from being 
forced into his premises by floodwater: 
I think we could put a big stopcock on the… probably on the soil pipes. I don’t 
know; I’d have to have a look at it. [Pause] But then most pipes coming back 
from the stopcock, you know, most soil pipes even going into the ground are just 
plastic. You probably need to put metal ones in, because the pressure of the 
water, it’s probably way beyond what the plastic pipe’s designed to cope with. 
 
This passage marks a sharp contrast with the extract from Phillip’s interview presented 
earlier. Although John’s interrogation of the idea is similarly rigorous to Phillip’s the 
lack of resistance from his sensemaking structures leaves him more open to PLR and 
allows him to search for ways around the presenting challenges. 
4. The influence of emotional reactions 
In this final findings section, we interrogate our data for evidence of reported or 
expressed emotional reactions to the flooding and ask whether this might be 
associated with success in defending interpretative frameworks. In particular, we look 
for evidence regarding Byrne and Shepherd’s (2015) claim that the transformation of 
sensemaking systems requires both positive and negative emotional responses to a 
crisis event. The conclusions of this search are shown in Figure 4. 
To this end, we contrast the emotional responses of businesses that changed their 
sensemaking structures as a result of flooding with those that continued to resist 
acceptance of the flood risk and PLR. Notwithstanding the small size of the sample for 
such an exercise, this analysis provides some support for the contention that both 
positive and negative emotional cognitions are required for the revision of 
sensemaking structures. However, it also points to the possibility that this argument is 
only valid for aspects of interpretative frameworks that constitute core parts of 
identity.  
Of those whose sensemaking structures changed in response to the flooding, the data 
from three interviews supports Byrne and Shepherd’s assertion and that from a fourth, 
with Barry, does not. Although Barry describes the flood as “frightening” in the speed 
of its arrival, in contrast to the interviews with Clive, Gail and Gordon, this allusion to 
fear is the only signal of negative emotion. Barry also conveys less positive emotion. 
Gail describes customers’ response to the flooding as “really understanding” and says 
that her insurers were “really good”; Gordon says his insurance company and loss 
adjuster deserve “nothing but praise”, and Clive associates positive emotions with the 
cleaning-up process (“cheerful staff”; getting “stuck in”; “good fun”). In contrast, when 
Barry describes himself as “lucky” to have been on site at the time of the flood and to 
have rescued threatened stock, the flat tone and absence of hyperbole convey a less 
positively valenced emotion.  
This lack of strong emotional signals is not explored in Barry’s interview. However, it is 
notable that the changes to his sensemaking structures and the resulting adaptive 
behaviours both relate to the tenanted business units, a part of the business to which 
he is less emotionally attached. Barry reports that he bought these units from his 
erstwhile landlord only because they were packaged with the freehold for his existing 
vehicle repairs business, and he suggests that they had never became a core part of his 
business’ social identify. This explains why the representation of the tenanted units 
was not defended with as much determination; Barry did not want them to “drive 
down” the rest of the business so the sacrifice of this part of the business defended 
the sensemaking structures and identity of the business as a whole. This leads us to 
hypothesise that the requirement for positively and negatively valenced emotions 
might depend on the significance of the impacted interpretative framework to the 
identity of the business. This, in turn, leads us to suggest an additional category of 
business owner: that for whom the defence of the relevant interpretation framework, 
being relatively weak, can be penetrated by a flood that is not ontologically significant. 
Figure 4 Emotional responses to flooding (amongst those with interpretation 
frameworks not conducive to PLR) 
 
 
We now turn to the interviews with those whose interpretative frameworks did not 
change. As predicted by Byrne and Shepherd’s (2015) proposition, none of these 
interviews demonstrated negative and positive emotional responses to the flooding. 
Two revealed very little emotional response at all: Karen who conveyed detachment 
(“so there’s no point in panicking about the inevitable”) and Gary claimed to be “pretty 
sanguine”. Others described positive emotions only: a determination “to be happy” 
(Gilbert) or a focus on the “novelty” or “comical” characteristics of the flood (Phillip). 
Finally, Martin’s interview demonstrated a strong negative response (“very, very 
upsetting”; “grim”) but did not reveal any positive emotions. 
 
Discussion 
This study set out to understand the influence of interpretation frameworks and 
business identities on owners’ learning from, and responses to, flood events. The 
research found some evidence to support Maitlis and Christianson’s assertion that 
owners respond to such threats by “constructing new accounts of themselves and their 
organisations” (2014, p75) but also noted the use of ego defences to defend their 
identities and associated sensemaking structures (see Brown and Starkey, 2000). The 
analysis indicates that commitment to interpretation frameworks and identities can 
sometimes prevent owners from revising their assessments of the probabilities and 
likely impacts of flooding, and from extending the range of adaptive measures they 
consider. The interviews revealed efforts to defend pre-flood representations of 
businesses (as “happy”, destined for success, self-reliant etc.) using rhetorical tactics 
such as denial, attention deployment and the externalisation of responsibility. 
Similarly, prompts to consider types of PLR that did not fit comfortably with owners’ 
interpretation frameworks sometimes led to the use of rhetorical tactics to 
delegitimise PLR. The data suggests that only floods that are ontologically significant 
are able to transform frameworks that are critical to business identity, and it indicates 
that this effect might be mediated by the mixture of positive and negative emotions 
that are generated by such floods and not suppressed by emotion regulation 
strategies. Smaller floods, the analysis suggests, will only transform interpretation 
frameworks that are less central to identity. 
The study has a number of limitations. Firstly, although analysis of talk is always 
subjective, it is especially so when the aim is to identify rhetorical strategies of which 
participants themselves are not cognisant. Secondly, although narrative interviewing 
reduces recall bias by allowing participants to gradually reconstitute their memories of 
past events, the historical nature of the flooding in some of the interviews may have 
affected data quality. Although these two limitations are undeniable, their significance 
for this study is constrained by the aims and epistemological framing for this study, for 
neither of which reliability is a relevant mark of quality. Rather than seeking reliable 
findings, this research set out to identify plausible explanations that challenge existing 
explanations of small business ‘inattention’ to crisis planning. We believe that we have 
found sufficient evidence to constitute such a challenge and that these findings, 
although tentative, warrant elaboration in further research.  
A further limitation of this study is its exclusive focus on small and micro businesses. 
The absence of large in the sample precludes empirical commentary on differences in 
climate change adaptation that result from company size. However, the study’s 
conclusions about the role of business identify do suggest an avenue for exploration. 
Smaller businesses are more often “tied up with the life and identity” of owners 
(Culkin and Smith, 2000, p149), who are usually more invested in the business’ identity 
than are decision-makers in larger companies, which tend to have more role 
specialisation. This might serve to magnify the importance, in small firms, of the role of 
interpretation frameworks in slowing adaptation to climate change.  
The findings of this study are potentially discouraging for those seeking to promote 
small business adaptation. However, it is worth noting that they are the result, at least 
in part, of the sensemaking approach’s focus on individuals as the unit of analysis 
(Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). Although sensemaking is described as a 
“fundamentally social process” (Maitlis, 2005: p21), few studies take account of social 
influences that originate from outside the protagonist organisation (Sandberg and 
Tsoukas, 2015; though for an exception see Gephart, 1993). As a result, the circular 
relationship between sense and action (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015) appears to leave 
interpretation frameworks closed to propositional influences exerted by social entities 
other than the organisation itself. Complementary studies are needed that look at the 
discursive knowledge and learning that results from collisions between contradictory 
propositions within the social milieu of the small business owner.   
It is also worth noting, however, that the participants appeared to have no great 
appetite for discursive learning that reached out beyond existing social networks. 
Neither spontaneously, nor when prompted, did owners say that they had, or would 
be willing to, consult outside experts. In fact, remarks made after the interviews 
indicated that they would only trust the opinions and advice of other owners of small 
businesses. The challenge of extending the range of sources from which owners are 
willing to acquire discursive knowledge is, we believe, a key issue for those wishing to 
promote climate change adaptation amongst small businesses.  
As well as pointing to a weakness of sensemaking theory as it is currently applied, this 
study helps explain why only a minority of small businesses adapt to flood risk after a 
flood event. Our arguments illustrate how, when faced with the risk of flooding, 
owners’ assumptive worlds and pre-existing representations restrict their capacity to 
gain the kind of learning that would prompt them to adapt to the ongoing flood risk. In 
the presence of these knowledge constructions, there seemed to be a limited 
possibility of some businesses either accepting that there was an ongoing flood risk or 
implementing new ways of reducing their vulnerability.  
Additionally, the study found no support for Burgoyne and Hodgson (1983) and Levitt 
and March (1988) argument that repeated low-intensity events gradually erode 
existing interpretation frameworks even when there is initial resistance to such 
change. The analysis of the interviews presents the possibility that statistical 
associations between repetition and adaptation are spurious findings – the result of a 
historical succession of small and a single, subsequent larger flood event. The analysis 
in this paper supports Krasner’s (1988) and Appelbaum & Goransson’s (1997) assertion 
that the revision of such frameworks is prompted by conceptual challenges to 
businesses’ assumptive worlds, rather than by the material impacts of external shocks. 
It is, as Maitlis et al (2013) argue, the felt emotions associated with an external shock 
that “energise” sensemaking sufficiently to overcome the “cognitive, identity, and 
social costs” involved in adapting interpretation frameworks (p5). A series of smaller 
shocks would not provide this ‘energisation’. This suggests, also, that Maitlis et al.’s 
(2013) model of the role of emotions in sensemaking requires reviewing. They propose 
that moderately negative emotions will prompt the revision of interpretation 
frameworks but that extremely negative ones will not; our analysis suggests that the 
force of moderate emotions is more easily deflected by defensive strategies than that 
of more extreme emotions. 
The key question, therefore, is whether an external shock such as a flood creates 
sufficient emotional impact on the owner. We propose the term ontological shock to 
distinguish shocks that do from those that do not. This distinction, we suggest, will 
help avoid category errors in studies testing for correlations between shocks and 
behavioural responses to those shocks. It might also help focus attention on the 
emotional gravity of floods and reduce the existing, sometimes unhelpful, focus on 
their physical characteristics. 
Alongside the intensity of the challenge to identity-critical assumptions, a second 
factor affecting the impact of emotions on sensemaking structures is the combination 
of emotional responses. Our analysis provides some support for Byrne and Shepherd’s 
(2015) assertion that a combination of positive and negative emotional reactions is a 
prerequisite for the revision of sensemaking structures. The presence of blame-
avoidance strategies amongst those that did not change their sensemaking structures 
also indicates some support for Yamakawa et al.’s (2015) argument that guilt acts as a 
motivator of change. The defence of sensemaking structures illustrated in this study is 
an example of how people manipulate their cognitive responses to initial physiological 
arousals in order to minimise the latter’s negative impacts (see Gross, 1998; 2015). As 
a result of their need to retain their focus on long-term business goals, small business 
owners are particularly adept at this (O’Shea et al, 2017); this, the study suggests, can 
reduce negative emotional cognitions to the point where there is insufficient ‘energy’ 
to fuel changes to sensemaking systems and behaviour.  
Attempts at emotional regulation, this research found, also delegitimise the notion of 
adaptation. Owners whose sensemaking structures were not either in flux or 
compatible with resilient adaptations were less able to search for new ways of 
improving business resilience. They relied, instead, on established, familiar and trusted 
forms of adaptation. This begins to explain small business owners’ apparent 
‘indifference’ to crisis planning (Spillan and Hough, 2003). Although initially puzzling 
and contradictory to the observer this ‘indifference’ is, our evidence suggests, 
instrumental, intentional and aimed at defending identity.  
Conclusions and implications 
This study points to the need for a revision of both the theory and application of 
sensemaking. Firstly, it suggests that sensemaking should learn from theories in 
psychology, such as social representations theory, by broadening its purview beyond 
the business organisation itself (Weber and Glynn, 2006) and analysing the broader 
social context within which decision makers operate. Although owners may sometimes 
limit their discursive references to within their own business in-groups, it is important 
to understand what role is played in the formation of sensemaking structures by actors 
from outside their organisations. Examples suggested by this research include local 
authorities and professions such as building and architecture, but other examples 
might include trade groups, businesses associations such as chambers of commerce 
and even government bodies such as the Environment Agency. Expanding analyses to 
include such external influences on the sensemaking process is a necessary 
complement to the present study’s attempt to understand the inertia evident in 
businesses’ responses to flood risk and climate change.  
The arguments presented in this manuscript call into question the pre-eminence of 
resource scarcity and information deficit explanations for the poor disaster-readiness 
of small firms. They elaborate alternative explanations based on questions of social 
identity and its role in obfuscating the meaning of information and ruling out certain 
behaviours. This research only looked at businesses’ responses to direct experience of 
flooding and not at their responses to information from other sources. However, if 
there is validity to the sensemaking approach and to this study’s conclusions about the 
role of interpretation frameworks, this obfuscation is likely to apply, also, to 
information provided by government campaigns, websites etc.  This would suggest a 
need to review the ongoing reliance on information provision (e.g. Defra, 2016). Our 
conclusions regarding the role of identity in anchoring interpretative frameworks 
indicate that such campaigns are likely to fail if the information is perceived as coming 
from an out-group or as threatening social identity. 
This study throws up suggestions for the design of future research into business 
adaptation. Survey-based studies into the impacts of external shocks, it suggests, 
should distinguish between ‘big’, ontological shocks and ‘ordinary’ events. Further 
qualitative enquiry is needed into the factors that determine why floods are 
sometimes perceived as big and sometimes not.  
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